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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter arising from 
the Second District Court, Davis County. This case was originally filed in the 
Utah Supreme Court and the case was transferred to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-
2a-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) [hereinafter referred to as "UCA"]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF TRIAL COURTS JUDGMENT 
The appellate courts in Utah are to accord no particular deference 
to the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 
(Ct. App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 
(Utah 1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless they are 
against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. 
H. DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSE 
WHICH WAS NOT PLEAD 
Defendants never raised the defense that the Notice of Lien did 
not comply with the Mechanic's lien statute in any of their pleadings. Since it 
was not plead, then the Defendants waived this defense and they should have 
been unable to present this defense at the trial. Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of 
1 
Civil Procedure [hereinafter "URCP"]; Creekview Apartments v. State Farm 
Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693 (Utah App. 1989); Gill v. Timm. 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 
1986); Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co.. 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
HI. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED 
UPON MECHANICS LIEN 
Under §38-1-7, UCA. a notice of lien claim is to set forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or, 
if not known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the 
equipment or material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor was 
performed . . . ; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or 
certificate . . . . 
The trial court concluded that the Notice of Lien was defective. 
The defects it found (R.309-317, Amended Findings of Fact 23, 26, 27, and 28) 
[a copy of said Lien is attached hereto, marked as Exhibit "D", and 
incorporated herein by reference] relate to the Plaintiffs compliance with 
subsections (b) and (e). 
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Since, in any event, the Lien was in substantial compliance with 
the lien statute, see, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983), 
and Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prod. Co.. 449 P.2d 
116 (Utah 1969), then the Lien satisfies the law and should have been 
enforced by the lower court, and attorneys fees and costs should have been 
awarded. 
IV. DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO 
ASSERT DEFENSES AT THE TRIAL BECAUSE THEY DID 
NOT SIGN THEIR ANSWER AS REQUIRED BY RULE 11 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike in which they sought to have the 
Defendants' Answer stricken because it was not signed. Rule 11, URCP. 
provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
. . ." . The Court erred in not striking this answer. This failure was 
exacerbated because the court let the Defendants present evidence in support 
of their defenses at the trial. Rule 11, URCP. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought in March, 1990 by Floor Coverings by 
Certified, Inc., a Utah corporation [herein referred to as "Floor Coverings" or 
as the "Plaintiff] (R.309-3P, Amended Finding nj Furl 2* against Stacy B. 
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Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan [herein referred to jointly as "the Morgans" or 
as the "Defendants"], who are individuals residing in Davis County, Utah. 
(R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 1) 
The Morgans are presently the owners in fee of certain real 
property which serves as their residence, and is located at 773 South 825 East, 
Layton, Utah [referred to herein as to "the Property"]. (R.309-317, Amended 
Finding of Fact 4) The Morgans purchased said property from Richard Miles 
Construction and Development, which sale closed on November 24, 1989, 
pursuant to an Earnest Money Agreement that had been signed in May of 
1989. (R.T.P. 80, 192-93). 
The Morgans were told by Richard Miles Construction to make 
their own arrangements for floor coverings to be purchased and installed at 
the Property. (R.T.P. 99, 159-160). The Morgans contacted Don Smith, a 
carpet manufacturers' representative, regarding installing carpet. (R.T.P. 50, 
51, 53, and 55) Mr. Smith told the Morgans that he could arrange for Floor 
Coverings to procure and install the carpet for them. (R.T.P. 56) It is the 
practice of Floor Coverings to deal directly with the customers and not with 
their builder. (R.T.P. 19) The trial court found that the Morgans had 
purchased the carpeting from Don Smith. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of 
Fact 7) 
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In October ol' 1989, Floor Coverings was first contacted regarding 
making improvements on said Property, in particular, the installation of vinyl 
floor coverings and carpeting. (R.T.P. 11) On or about the 15th day of 
November, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the first materials and labor and, on or 
about Nover -"• 1/, 1^89, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and 
labor as required at said Property. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 3) 
Despite demand therefore, Defendants did not pay the sums due 
and owing for said labor and materials. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of 
Lien to be filed with the Office of the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 
880784, Book 1332 Page 818, a true copy of which is attached hereto, marked 
as Exhibit "D", and incorporated herein by reference, herein "Notice of Lien"]. 
(R.309-317, Amended Finding of Facts 12) Plaintiff duly mailed a copy of 
said Notice of Lien to Defendants by certified mail. (R.T.P. 25) 
Defendants were originally billed $2,115.00. (R.309-317, Amended 
Finding of Fact 11) The Morgans later advised Floor Coverings that they 
were thought the area liad been incorrectly measured and a step was not 
properly laid. (R.T.P. 20) There was a meeting between the parties on March 
23, 1990 at which the Plaintiff fixed the problem with the step and went 
through the measurement of the job. (R.T.P. 20, 160, and Plaintiffs Exh. 11) 
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At that time, the parties agreed that Floor Coverings would subtract $75 from 
the bill and that the Defendants would pay the principal sum of $2,040. 
(R.T.P. 21) 
At that time, Defendants owed the agreed principal sum of 
$2,040.00, plus interest at ten (10%) percent per annum from November 17, 
1989, a recording fee of $100 for the Notice of Lien, court and foreclosure 
costs, and attorney's fees, for the materials and labor furnished towards the 
improvement of said Property. (R.T.P. 29-30) 
In the litigation, Plaintiff sought (among other things) for the trial 
court to enter an order allowing them to foreclose on the mechanic's Lien 
which had been filed against the Property. Initially, the Morgans filed an 
unsigned pro se answer [a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" 
and incorporated herein by reference] (R.21-22, Plaintiffs Exh. 11), in which 
they asserted as defenses: 
1. They were only acting as agents for Miles Construction when 
they went through Don Smith to have the carpeting and vinyl installed at their 
place and the agreement was with Don Smith, not Plaintiff; 
2. They were not acting as a general contractor; 
3. Miles Construction had a bond; 
4. They were not the owners of the subject property at the time 
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they ordered the job; and 
5. They were not unjustly enriched. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, [or in the 
alternative, Motion to Strike Pleading under Rule 11] on about May IS, 1990 
(R.26-28) and mailed a Request for Ruling relative thereto on or about June 
5, 1990. (R.61-63) A few days later the Morgans mailed Plaintiff a check, 
non-cashiers, for $2,040. (R.T.P. 20, Defendants' Exh. 1) Plaintiff did not 
know if the check would clear, and decided to hold on to the same until after 
the Judgment was entered, and then apply it against the sums due thereunder, 
which was done. (R.l 11-126) 
Subsequently, the Morgans proceeded with a Motion to set aside 
the Judgment under Rule 60(b) (R.80-88), which was granted by the Court. 
(R.140-142) Thereaft'• Plaintiff again iikd a Motion lor Summary 
Judgement or to Strike the Morgan's unsigned Answer (R.146-148), which was 
denied, without setting a deadline for the Morgans or their attorneys to sign 
the Answer. (R.196-197) The Morgan's counsel never sought to amend their 
Answer, before, during or after I he trial and no one ever signed the Answer 
that was filed by the Morgans. 
Eventually, this case came on for trial before Judge Cornaby 
without a jury on May 31, 1991. He held that there was no contract between 
7 
the Plaintiff and Floor Coverings, did not rule with respect to the failure of 
the Morgans to have a bond, and determined that the Plaintiff was entitled to 
a judgment based upon unjust enrichment. On the mechanics lien cause of 
action, the court held that the Lien was not enforceable because it did not 
comply with the mechanics lien statute. (R.309-317, Amended Conclusion of 
Law 3) The trial court found these shortcomings in the Notice of Lien: 
1. the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was the signature of 
an individual only; 
2. the corporate officer did not state under oath that the 
contents of the lien were correct; 
3. the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that 
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful"; 
4. Plaintiff incorrectly listed the Morgans as the persons by 
whom they were employed [although they believed the Morgans hired them]; 
and 
5. Plaintiff did not list the correct amount owing on the lien. 
(R.309-317, Amended Findings of Fact 23, 26, 27, and 28 and Conclusions of 
Law 3 and 4). 
& 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The lower court erred when it granted the Judgment because: 
1. The Defendants waived their right to assert that the Notice 
as a defense, the issue was not tried by consent and the Defendants never 
sought relief to have their Answer amended. 
2. The Notice of Lien satisfies the statutory requirements, but 
to the extent it docs not, il was in substantial romplianre with the law. 
3. A judgment should have been entered against the Morgans 
because they did not have a contractors bond. 
4. The Defendants Answer should have been stricken under 
present evidence in support of their defenses at the trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner asserts the following points of law in support hereof: 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellate Courts in Utah are to accord no particular 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, Hoth v. White. 142 Utah Adv. 
Rep ^ i (Ct. App. 1990), Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 
2 
R.T.2d 467, (Utah 1989), but should not set aside the factual findings unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence. Id-
H. DEFENDANTS WAIVED RIGHT TO ASSERT DEFENSE NOT 
PLEAD 
No pleading exists wherein the Defendants set forth allegations 
that (1) the Notice of Lien was illegal or unenforceable due to its failure to 
comply with the Mechanic's lien statute or (2) the Plaintiff released or waived 
the right to enforce the same. 
Rule 12(h), URCP. sates that "[a] party waives all defenses and 
objections that he does not present either by motion [under Rule 12(b)].. . or 
by his answer". Rule 9(c), URCP. requires a party to affirmatively plead a 
long list of defenses, including illegality, release and waiver, "and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." 
A matter constitutes an "avoidance" that must be plead when it 
suggests that the "complaint is invalid for other reasons not embraced by the 
pleading". Creekview Apartments. 771 P.2d at 695. "Affirmative defenses" 
generally are those assertions which could have the effect of defeating or 
tending to defeat the claim on its merits [propositions that the defendant may 
interpose to defeat plaintiffs prima facie case]. First National Bank v. Higgs. 
406 So.2d 673 (La.App. 1981); W.R. Grace Co. v. Scotch Corp.. Inc.. 753 
10 
S.W.2d 743 (TexApp.-Austin 1988). 
In reading the Plaintiff's Complaint (R.l-14) it does not appear 
from its face that the Notice of Lien would be unenforceable due to its failure 
to comply with the Mechanics Lien statute or due to a release or a waiver of 
Plaintiffs rights. In fact, to establish such a defense, the Morgans had to 
prove, among other things, that (a) the amount stated on the face of the 
Notice of Lien was not correct and (b) the Floor Coverings contract for the 
carpet and vinyl was with Mr. Smith and not with them. It was not apparent 
from the Complaint that the Notice of Lien was somehow unenforceable for 
these reasons. 
Since the illegality defense was not embraced by the Complaint, it 
was an avoidance that had to be either plead or waived under the Creekview 
Apartments analysis. Moreover, such a claim of illegality would have the 
effect of defeating the Plaintiffs mechanics lien claim on the merits and was 
an affirmative defense that had to be plead. Under the Utah case law, 
a defendant would not have to raise such a claim in his pleading if the issue 
had been tried by express or implied consent of the parties. Mabey v. Kay 
Peterson Constr. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). However, in the case sub judice 
the Plaintiff [in their Trial Memorandum] specifically objected to the 
Defendants presentation of the claim that the Notice of Lien did not comport 
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with the relevant statute, since this defense had not been plead. Thus, the 
Plaintiff did not consent to the presentation of this defense and the same was 
waived by the Defendants. 
Further, the Defendants could have sought to amend their Answer 
to add this defense under Rule 15(b), URCP. Id.. No such action was taken 
before, during or after the trial in the present case. 
The Defendants waived this defense, and they should not have 
been able to present the same at the trial, and the trial court committed error 
when it made findings of fact and reached a legal conclusion based upon a 
waived defense. 
m. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED CLAIM BASED 
UPON MECHANICS LIEN 
A. CONTESTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs do not contest Finding of Fact 23 [amount listed on lien 
as being owed is incorrect]. 
Plaintiff contests these portions of Finding of Fact 26: (a) the 
signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an officer only; (b) the 
corporate officer did not state under oath that the contents of the lien were 
correct; and (c) the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that 
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful". 
The only testimony that had any relevance on this issue was that of Alan 
12 
Delahunty, who said that he had been an officer for Floor Coverings by 
Certified, a Utah corporation, for some years. (R.T.P. 10). The only other 
evidence on the issue was the Notice of Lien itself [Exhibit "D"]. Set forth 
below are the reasons why the trial court's analysis of the Lien was incorrect. 
Plaintiff contests Finding of Fact 27 [Lien did not list the person 
by whom the Plaintiff was employed]. The court made this finding because it 
believed that the Morgans had hired Don Smith, not the Plaintiff. Although 
Plaintiff does not believe this scenario was correct, they do not contest that 
Don Smith was hired by the Morgans. However, this is not the complete 
picture of what happened. Even if the Morgans hired Mr. Smith, Plaintiff still 
contests that the Lien did not list the correct person who hired them for the 
reasons set forth below. 
Plaintiff contests Finding of Fact 28 [Lien was unenforceable], 
although this is really a conclusion of law, for the reasons set forth below. 
B. FIRST ALLEGED DEFECT 
Under §38-1-7, UCA. a notice of lien claim is to set forth: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known, or, if not 
known, the name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or 
to whom he furnished the equipment or material; 
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(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed . . 
• > 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized 
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate . . . . 
The first defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was 
that amount claimed as being due and owing was incorrect. 
At the time the Lien [Exhibit "D"] was prepared, Plaintiff believed 
that $2,115 was the correct amount due and owing. Later, after being 
contacted by the Morgans, Floor Coverings re-measured the area at the 
Defendants home with their assistance and the parties agreed to reduce the 
bill by $75 [to $2,040]. When the summary judgment was granted, Plaintiff 
sought the entry of a judgment with a $2,040 principal. 
Subsequently, after the trial court heard the testimony of four 
different carpet layers with respect to the finding of a reasonable 
measurement and per yard rate, it found that the correct amount for unjust 
enrichment purposes was $1,959.60, which is about $80 less than the parties 
had agreed and $150 less than was reflected on the original Lien. 
First, the lien statute does not require a Notice of Lien to set forth 
the amount they claim is owed on the job. As a general proposition, a 
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claimant is not required to satisfy any tests that are not specifically set forth in 
the mechanic's lien law. Buehner Block v.Glezos. 310 P.2d 517 (Utah 1957) [if 
notice satisfies the statutory requirements, then it does not have to set forth 
any other information which might be useful or desireable]. Even if Plaintiff 
was required to set forth the amount claimed, where the amount claimed is 
within about seven percent [7%] of the amount later found by the court to be 
correct, then the amount claimed in the Lien was in substantial compliance 
with the lien statute, see, Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 
1969), and Roberts Investment Co. v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Prod. Co.. 
449 P.2d 116 (Utah 1969). The Defendants did not produce any evidence at 
trial that the filing of a Lien that contained a claim that was slightly more than 
what was owed had any adverse effect on them. The Lien in the present case 
satisfies the law in this regard and should have been enforced by the lower 
court. 
C SECOND ALLEGED DEFECT 
The next defect found by the trial court in the Notice of Lien was 
that the persons listed on the Lien [the Morgans] were not the ones who hired 
Plaintiff, although Plaintiff believed the Morgans had hired them [relating to 
sub-part (b)]. 
The mechanics lien statute allows the lien claimant an option to 
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list the "name of the person by whom he was employed or [the name of the 
person] to whom he furnished the equipment or material" §38-1-7(b), UCA 
[emphasis added]. Even if the Morgans were not the persons who hired Floor 
Coverings, they were the persons to whom the material was furnished. This 
result follows from the fact that the trial court entered a judgment against the 
Morgans based upon unjust enrichment (R.309-317, Amended Conclusion of 
Law 4) because they were the persons who had benefited from the installation 
of the carpet and vinyl. Therefore, by listing the Morgans on the Lien as the 
persons to whom Floor Coverings furnished the materials, the second part of 
subsection (b) is satisfied. The lower court erred in finding that the Notice of 
Lien was defective in this regard. 
Additionally, at the time the Lien was prepared, it was Floor 
Covering's understanding that they were being employed by the Morgans. 
However, the trial court determined that the Plaintiff had actually been 
employed by Don Smith, the carpet broker who was acting as the Morgans 
operative with regard to the purchase and installation of the vinyl and carpet. 
Even if Plaintiff was not directly employed by the Morgans, they were 
indirectly employed by the Morgans because Don Smith retained them for the 
Morgans' benefit. (R.T.P. 147 - 150, Plaintiffs Exh. 11) Plaintiff was not 
hired to install carpet at Don Smith's house, but at the Morgans house, so he 
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must have been acting as the Morgans' agent when he retained them for this 
job. Therefore, the Plaintiff was correct in listing the Morgans as the persons 
by whom they were employed. 
In any event, the Notice of Lien would be in substantial 
compliance with the lien statute and should have been enforced. 
D. THIRD GROUP OF ALLEGED DEFECTS 
Judge Cornaby found the following technical problem with Lien: 
(a) the signature of the corporate Plaintiff was that of an 
officer only. 
Assuming arguendo that this items is required by law, then in 
interpreting a notice of lien," all parts of the notice should be read together 
and in a consistent manner. The Notice of Lien in this case states that: 
NOTICE: . . . The undersigned Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc. 
hereby gives notice. . . . 
* * * * # * 
* * * * * * 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY 
Floor Coverings CERTIFIED, INC. 
Corporate Seal 
s/ Wayne Dudley s/ Alan Delahunty 
Secretary Authorized Officer 
17 
The notarized acknowledgment on the next page of the Lien 
contains the following language: "before me, the undersigned notary, 
personally appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings 
by Certified, Inc., who . . . signed the preceding document in my presence 
and who swore or affirmed to me . . . that the document was signed on 
behalf of said corporation by authority of a Resolution of the corporation's 
board of directors and acknowledged that THE CORPORATION 
EXECUTED THE SAME and that the seal affixed is that of said 
corporation". The Lien is signed by two different corporate officers and the 
corporate seal has been affixed. 
There are no facts in the record, nor does the face of the Lien 
support the view that, Alan Delahunty was signing the Lien individually, or, in 
any fashion, except in a representative capacity on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Finally, the lower court found these technical problems with the 
Notice of Lien: 
(a) the corporate officer did not state under oath that the 
contents of the lien were correct; 
(b) the notary was the person "who swore or affirmed to me that 
he signed it voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document is truthful". 
The notarized acknowledgment on the second page states that: 
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"before me . . . appeared Alan Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor 
Coverings . . . who signed the preceding document [Notice of Lien] in my 
presence and who swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its 
stated purpose, that the document is truthful". 
This language places grave doubts on the trial court's conclusion 
that the corporate officer did not state under oath that the contents of the 
Lien were correct. 
Finally, the duly notarized acknowledgment contains the following 
language: "before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared Alan 
Delahunty, as the Vice President of Floor Coverings . . . [whose identity was 
appropriately established] to be the person who signed the preceding 
document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me that he [Alan] 
signed the document voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document is 
truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said corporation ..." 
In sum, Mr. Delahunty personally appeared before the notary, his 
identity was verified by the notary, and then Alan swore to the notary that he 
signed the preceding document [the Notice of Lien] in the notary's presence, 
voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the document was truthful. The phrase 
"preceding document", of necessity, refers to the Notice of Lien. The notary 
did not sign the preceding Lien. Thus, in contrast to what the trial court 
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concluded, Alan Delahunty, and not the notary, was the person who swore or 
affirmed that he signed the Lien voluntarily, for its stated purpose and the 
Lien is truthful. Certainly the language in the acknowledgment is in 
substantial compliance with the lien requirements, and the lower court erred 
when it concluded otherwise. 
A very similar mechanics lien notary provision was reviewed for 
compliance with the lien statute in the case of In re Williamson. 43 B.R. 813 
(Bktrcy.Ct.D. Utah 1984) and it was upheld as being an enforceable lien. 
Moreover, the Utah Department of Business Regulation issued a 
document in 1988 entitled the Utah Notary Public Guide, which contained 
copies of various recommended forms for Notary Certificates [Exhibit "F"]. 
Forms A, B, and C set forth therein are almost identical to the certificate that 
is at issue in this case. The reason for that is because, when the Plaintiffs 
notice of lien was drafted, the drafter relied upon these Notary Guides in 
preparing the "certificate". Certainly, where an administrative body has puts 
forth its interpretation of what will satisfy the law that is within its purview 
then that interpretation should be presumed to be correct. Morton Internat. 
v. Auditing Div. of the Utah Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Therefore, it was error for the trial judge to conclude that the Notice of Lien 
was not in substantial compliance with the statute. 
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Since the mechanics lien statute should be interpretated in the 
most liberal and comprehensive manner in favor of the lien claimant, 53 
AmJur.2d Mechanics Liens. §§ 18 and 23; Frehner v. Morton. 424 P.2d 446, 
18 Utah 2d 422 (1967), then the trial court erred on the lien issue. 
IV. JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED BASED 
UPON FAILURE TO HAVE A BOND 
The Defendants in their Answer [Exhibit "E"] dated April 4,1990, 
state that "[o]n March 23, 1990, we [the Morgans] reached an agreement with 
Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and service." The testimony of 
Alan Delahunty was that he meet with the Morgans on that day, there was a 
problem with the carpet on one step and the Morgans had a question about 
the amount of material that was installed. (R.T.P. 20) He fixed the step to 
their satisfaction and the parties measured the job together. (R.T.P. 21) They 
discovered that there had been an error that resulted in the bill being $75 too 
large, and a credit was given, leaving as balance of $2,040. (R.T.P. 21) The 
Morgans indicated that they were satisfied with the measurements. (R.T.P. 21) 
They sent their Answer just a few days after the meeting. Subsequently, the 
Morgans sent Plaintiff a check that was in the sum of $2,040, which was a 
clear indication of what the Morgans understood the agreement to be. 
The Morgans made no further claims that they were dissatisfied 
with the carpet measurement until after they retained counsel [who is in the 
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carpet business]. 
Since the Morgans stated in their Answer, which was never 
amended, that they had reached an agreement on the measurement issue, 
then they are estopped from raising this issue further. A general rule applied 
in judicial matters is that a party will not be allowed to take a position on a 
matter that is directly contrary to one which he previously assumed, where he 
is chargeable with knowledge of the facts and another will be prejudiced 
thereby. 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §68; Estate of Ghristensen v. 
Christensen. 655 P.2d 646 (Utah 1982); Caldwell v. Anschute Drilling Co.. 13 
Utah 2d 177, 369 P.2d 964 (1962). As a result of this estoppel, the agreed 
amount due on the materials was $2,040. The Plaintiff would not have 
pursued the construction bond claim if they had known that the Defendants 
were going to repudiate this agreement. 
The Plaintiffs material was used on the Property, the value of the 
improvements exceeded $2,000.00 and Defendants did not obtain a bond for 
said improvements. (R.309-317, Amended Finding of Fact 24) This action was 
contrary to the requirements of Utah Code Unannotated §14-2-1 (1991), and 
the Morgans are liable therefore. John Wagner Associates v. Hercules. Inc.. 
797 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1990); Pierce v. Pepper. 17 Utah 2d 123, 405 P.2d 
345 (1965). 
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Under §14-2-1, UCA. the Morgans were owners who were obliged 
to obtain a contractor's bond on this job but did not do so. The failure to 
plead and prove the existence of such a bond results in a judgment being 
awarded under said law, and with an award of attorneys fees and costs. Triple 
I Supply. Inc. v. Sunset Rail. Inc.. 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). The trial court 
was mistaken when it concluded otherwise, and the judgment should be 
reversed and fees awarded according to the proof at the trial. 
V. DEFENDANTS WAIVED DEFENSES IN UNSIGNED 
ANSWER 
After the Defendants retained counsel, Plaintiff filed a second 
Motion to Strike sought to have the Defendants' Answer stricken because it 
was not signed. Rule 11, URCP. provides that "[i]f a pleading . . . is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader . . . . " . 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to 
Utah's Rule 11. A leading treatise states that all pleadings must be signed and 
"a typewritten name . . . is not sufficient". Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure §1333. In the event a party fails to sign a pleading, such an 
omission "will result in its being stricken, unless it is signed promptly after 
notice of the failure is given to the party or attorney". Moore's Federal 
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Practice f 11.002[1]. 
Therefore, the Court erred in not striking the Morgans' unsigned 
answer. This failure was exacerbated because the court allowed the 
Defendants to present their defenses at the trial. Rule 11, URCP. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the preceding argument, the lower court's judgment 
should be reversed to the extent it denied Plaintiff the right to foreclosure as 
prayed on the mechanics lien against the property of the Morgans [with a 
deficiency if necessary], and for their failure to have a bond, and judgment 
should be entered for Plaintiff, in the sum of $2,040, and with an award for a 
fee for filing and recording the Notice of Lien [$100], for foreclosure costs, for 
all pre-judgment costs, and for an award of attorneys fees through the end of 
the trial in accordance with the evidence that was introduced at the trial, and 
for an award of fees and costs following the trial and for the appeal, and for 
after accruing fees and costs. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 1992. 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR 
& ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Paul Franklin Farr 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postage prepaid, first class, 
to: 
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq. 
STEVE C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, UT 84041 
this 5th day of May, 1992. 
Paul Franklin Farr 
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314
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STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES """ """ ~" 
Attorney for Defendants •;•._•• • • 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 v- — •-:- v : "" "•''•' 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN : 
P. MORGAN, : 
Defendants. : 
: JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747303CN 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st 
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge. The Court, having previously entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGES and DECREES 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of $80.40, together with 
post-judgment costs and interest. 
DATED this js^f day of /y^-^Jc^ , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
P7 
JUEGS2E37 EUTEEED 
^ D 
c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof 
ouglasirj/Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
0053935 
Cll MFfl 
Steven C. Vanderlinden #3 314 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendants 
1133 North Main, Suite 2 00 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone (801) 544-9930 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STACY B. MORGAN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
BY CERTIFIED, 
and KRISTIN : 
: AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
: JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747303CN 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st 
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge. The Plaintiff was present and represented by his 
attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and 
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden. The court 
having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and 
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed 
the testimony of the parties and good cause appearing, hereby 
enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah. 
2. The Plaintiff was a corporation duly organized and 
validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its 
L'wi 2*3 J'j M- *** ,v jr. ^ > 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business 
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings11 ]. 
3. On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff 
furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November 
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor 
in performing the job [Invoice 2702] at the Property, 
4. The property located at 773 South 825 East in Davis 
County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the 
Defendants1 closed on their purchase of the same on November 24, 
1991. Defendants were the owners of said Property at the time the 
Notice of Lien was recorded against the same. 
5. That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for 
the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the 
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was 
$9.75. 
6. That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to 
Plaintiff for the purchase and installation of the carpet was 
$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the 
vinyl. 
7. That the Defendants believed they were entering into a 
contract with Don Smith and the Plaintiff believed they were 
entering into a contract with the Defendants. 
8. That no contract existed between the Plaintiff and 
Defendants. 
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9. On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's 
home, the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor 
$1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl 
for their home. 
10. In June, 1990, Miles Construction Company gave the 
Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased 
in their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the 
Plaintiff. 
11. Plaintiff sent the Defendanrs an invoice [Invoice No. 
2702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed 
on November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same. 
The amount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00. 
12. Since said invoice was not paid by Defendants, then 
Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to 
the Defendants about January 3, 1990. On January 19, 1990, Floor 
Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of 
the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818, 
hereinafter "Notice of Lien"]. 
13. On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for 
$2,040.00 for the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their 
home by the Plaintiff. 
14. That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and 
satisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on 
April 9, 1990. The Court did not do so. This action was filed on 
March 15, 1990. On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy 
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Morgan met at the property. A step was repaired and the floor was 
remeasured. At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed to deduct 
$75.00 from the bill due to its error. The balance due was 
$2,040.00. 
15. That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for 
default judgment. Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit 
signed by Alan Delahunty. The Plaintiff's attorney also signed 
this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the 
Defendants on May 18, 1990. That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants 
mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for 
$2,040.00 to settle the matter. The Defendants mailed the 
$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the .case, 
although no writing expressed such intention. The Court awarded 
the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00 
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of 
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00. The total 
was $3,584.00. The Plaintifffs counsel held Defendants1 check 
until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August 
7, 1990. On October 11, 1990, Steven C. Vanderlinden made an 
appearance for the Defendants and filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Summary Judgment. On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a 
public sale to be made of Defendants property pursuant to the 
judgment. The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public 
sale, claiming that to be the amount owing. The Court found the. 
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actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary 
restraining order. 
16. That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that 
they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed 
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the 
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff. 
17. That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of 
vinyl at $9-75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 13 0 yards of 
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,463.53. The total for 
both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00 
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees. 
18. That after the liens had been filed, Plaintiff 
acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his 
bill should be $2,040.00. 
19. That because there was no contract between the parties, 
and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that 
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is 
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the 
carpet is reasonable. 
20. Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage 
of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to 
the lawsuit. Said witnesses testified that they went to the home 
to measure the carpet. Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there 
was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,3 64.94, and 
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $3 90.00 and a 
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total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94. David Searle 
testified that there was 122.2 yards of carpet for a value of 
$1,374.75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total 
purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50. Dean 
Chidester testified that there was 118.67 yards of carpet for a 
- value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for 
a total purchase price of $1,725.04. 
5 21. That the difference between the high and the low figures 
S|| testified to in court is approximately $150.00. 
22. That the difference in the amount owed is significant to 
the Defendants. 
8 
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p| 23. That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect, 
24. That no one testified as to whether or not there was a 
? I bond in place. However, the Court assumes that there was no bond, 
I 
Z I 25. That the lien statute does not require privity between 
the parties and Plaintiff properly listed the Defendants as the 
<\\ owner or reputed owner of the property, 
H, 
<|| 26. That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated 
UK when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper 
description of the property, however, " the signature of the 
SI corporation is the'signature of an officer only. The corporate 
u I officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are 
<11 correct. The notary on the lien is the person who states "who 
§ | swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily, for its 
Q 
^|| stated purpose, and the document is truthful." 
all -6-
27. That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he 
was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones 
that hired him. 
28. That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable. 
29. Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the 
amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate 
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60. 
30. That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00 
of Plaintiff's money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant 
$80.40. 
31. That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
32. That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the 
amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants. 
33. Shortly after the work was completed on November 17, 
1990, Plaintiff mailed Defendants1 Invoice 2702, seeking the 
immediate payment of the same. The Plaintiff asserted that 
$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing. 
34. Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within 
the next thirty days. As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants 
to request payment.-
35. In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff 
sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien. 
36. In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the 
Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated 
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therefor in an amount equal to the reasonable value of the 
materials and services furnished, and it was not acting as a 
volunteer. 
37. The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by 
the mechanics1 lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990, 
Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by 
certified mail. 
38. The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time 
the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due 
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00]. 
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters 
its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-
entitled matter. 
2. That Plaintiff fs lien filed in the above-entitled lien 
is void and unenforceable. 
3. That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary. 
4. That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $1,959.60 
on the theory of unjust enrichment. 
5. That the Defendant has previously tendered to the 
Plaintiff $2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the 
Defendant of $80.40. 
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6. That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check 
previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,855.10. 
7. That neither party is entitled to attorneyfs fees or 
court costs. 
DATED this fL? day of 'Ss / 
^ - ^ ^ ' 1991, 
BY THF COURT: 
/ 
^L~*U- »>^y^ r-l te^«. 
To: 
-- "'Dougi^ s-^ /. Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE 
Paul Franklin Farr 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Busch Forum, Suite 54 0 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
You are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the 
Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after 
receipt of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment to file an Objection. 
DATED this /7^day of (^)^4r^>^^ 1991. 
c:\wp\docs\misc\morgan.fof 
- Q -
Paul Franklin Farr (#1040) 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 540 
BUSCH FORUM 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
Telephone: (801) 263-5555 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) Civil No. 900747303CN 
) Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
TO THE PARTIES HERETO, BY AND THROUGH THEIR RESPECTIVE 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, AND TO THE COURT: 
YOU are hereby notified that the above-entitled Plaintiff hereby appeals to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah from the Order and Judgment entered in this 
action on October 29, 1991. 
DATED this 26th day of December, 1991. 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed, first class, postage prepaid to: 
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq. 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
this i  ^ d a y of " P ^ - * ? 199/. 
Patth-FlanKrinFarr 
ICTICE C? LIEN 
WEEK RECORDED, MAIL 1C: 
£* S S 0 7 S 4 BK 1 3 3 2 PG S I S 
CAROL DEAN PAS* DAVIS CNTY RECORDER 
1990-JAN 1? 3:01 Ftt FEE 9.00 DE? JS 
fiEC'O FOR FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED I 
FLCOH COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, INC. 
P.O. BOX * - r - # 5 2 6 2 5 6 
SALT LAO CITY, UTAH - - - - -^ 8 4 1 5 2 
NOTICE: SEND COPY CF NOTICE CF LIEN BY CERTIFIED MAIL, 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED, TC CWEER. 
The undersigned Floor Coverings by C e r t i f i e d , Inc . 
hereby gives notice of intention to hold end d a i s a l i en upon 
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to be 
owned by S t a c e y B. & K r i s t i n P. Morgan and located 
in " u a v i s 
part icular ly as follows: 
County, Utan, wmca property i s mere 
JAN 19 1990 
SEE ATTACHED EXSIEIT "A" 
Exhibit "A" is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein bv reference- The .amount demanded hereby is 
$ $2,115.00 owing to the undersigned for labor and materials 
to improve the above described property. 
. The undersigned was emLoyed by Stacy B & Kristin P. Morgan 
who was the (owner) (contractor)/ such being done by tae 
undersigned under a contract made between said (owner) 
(contractor) and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of 
wtuca the undersigned did agree to furnish floor coverings in 
consideration of payment to the undersigned of $ $2,115.00 
upon completion of the job and under which contract the first 
labor and materials were finished on the 15th day 
of November , 198 9 and the last labor and materials were 
furnished on. the l7thday of November 1583 end for all of 
which labor and materials the undersigned became entitled to 
$ $2,115.00
 Wfcich is the reasonable value thereof, and on 
which payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed 
f. amounting to $ -0- . leaving a balance owing to the 
^^^oi^ersigned of ? $Z, 115.00 after deducting all just credits 
t J^i%%*4&B& fbffsets, and for which demand the undersigned holds and 
7 / ^ * ^ ; ^ by virtue of the provisions of Chapter h Tit] 
FHDGR COVERINGS By 
CERTIFIED, INC. 
T le 
'i(SEAL) / Secretary itnorized Officer 
E; BB0734- BK ± 3 3 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake) 
SSt 
On this 1 I day of 
.Ian Delammty, \ 
"before me, the undersigned notary, 
Vice President of Floor Coverings personally appeared Ala  .
 mw _ _ __ _ w 
by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or whose identity 
was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person who signed the 
preceding document in my presence and who swore or affirmed to me 
that he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the document 
is truthful, and that the document was signed on behalf of said 
corporation by the authority of a Resolution of the corporation's 
board of directorsand acknowledged that the corporation executed 
the same and that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation. 
..•; J • • • 
; ^ - ( S 2 A L ' ) ; * 
£' 
xy ^QAMJU 
NoxaryTFublic 
My Commission Expires . 3/iz/fz. 
'ptowi '&v&U*ty& 6y Sentenced, Inc. 
3003 HIGHLAND DRIVE SALT LAKECITY, UTAH 84106 
P. O. BOX 6256 
Ei S S 0 7 S 4 BK 1 3 3 2 PQ S2C 
EXHIBIT'^" 
:i:aS£:-2«37 
Ujf 
u x L ^ p ST5 MDc 457 
RECEIPT FOR CERTIFIED MAIL 
NO INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIOED 
NOT FOR INTERNATIONAL MAIL 
(See Reverse) 
Sent to 
Stacey B & Kr i s t in P. Morgah 
sat and No., W-825 E. 
T P.O., State and ZIP Code 
g L*yhnn TTtah fl^f&l 
Postage 
^ 
Certified Fee 
>/9 
Special Delivery Fee 
Restricted Oelivery Fee 
Return Receipt Showing 
to wnom and Oate Oeiivered w 
Return receipt snowing to wncm, 
Oate. and Address of Oelivery 
TOTAL Postage ana Fees i*yq 
£i&Bi3ss£§3& s& g£ feSSSW 
•
-SENDER: Compieta itama 1 and 2 whan additional service* ara deairad.-aiid,coinplataJ*-ma
 { 
^3 and 4. 3 t o g £ p q s g C T 5 ^ ^ *2* 
Put'your addrasa In tha "RETURN TO" Spaca on tha ravarsa side7 Failure to do thfa will pravat^_ Ja 
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April 4, 1990 _ 
To Whom It May Concern; 
This is in reply to summons served upon Stacey and Kristin Morgan 
regarding Floor Coverings by Certified, Inc., vs., Stacey B. 
Morgan and Kristin P. Morgan. On November 24, 1989, we purchased 
a home from Richard Miles Construction and Development. Prior to 
purchase, Miles Co. authorized us to make arrangements for floor 
coverings to be installed at 773 S. 825 E. Layton. We made an 
agreement with Don Smith for floor coverings. The agreement 
included price and quantity. Don Smith then contacted Floor 
coverings and instructed them to contact us to arrange for 
installation. 
Upon receipt of an invoice for service and material on or about 
December 1, 1989, we forwarded the invoice to Miles Co. At that 
time we contacted Floor coverings^regarding discrepancies in 
billing and unsatisfactory work. Floor Coverings subsequently 
contacted us again, whereby we contacted Miles Co. regarding 
payment. Floor Coverings then sent preliminary notice to lien, 
whereby we again contacted Miles Co. regarding payment. Floor 
Coverings subsequently attached lien to property while disputes 
regarding billing and service still existed. 
After lien was filed, Miles Co. sent us a check for an amount 
they determined was reasonable. We are still in possession of 
this check and do not wish to redeem or endorse as it may absolve 
Miles Co. of further liability. On March 23, 1990, we reached an 
agreement with Floor Coverings regarding disputed invoice and 
service. 
We are in the process of attempting to have Miles Co. pay 
interest, court fees, and attorney fees for which they are 
responsible. At no time in the period from November 8, 1989 to 
March 23, 1990 did we represent ourselves as anything but agents 
of Miles Co., which we were duly authorized to be. During this 
time, Miles Co. made no or little effort to pay the bill in a 
timely manner nor did they attempt to resolve any billing 
discrepancies in a timely manner. Floor Coverings by Certified 
knew of the agency relationship between us and Miles Co., yet 
they made no attempt to collect against Miles Co., who was the 
bonded owner of the said property when said floor coverings were 
installed. 
Response to Allegations 
#4 We were not the owners of property located at 773 S 825 E. 
Layton when flooring was installed in said property. 
Mtz ,-~«4-*.^ ,~+. uac. np\/pr entered into by us with Floor Coverings. 
#16 Never at any time did we act as general contractor. We were 
authorized by general contractor (Miles Co.) to act as an agent 
to procure floor covering. 
#21 General contractor did obtain bond for work performed. 
#30 We were not unjustly enriched as we paid general contractor 
for floor coverings when we purchased the property. 
Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan 
Recommended Forms of Notary Certificates 
A. If the signer is personally known to the notary: 
In the County of , State of Utah, on 
this day of , 19 , 
before me, the undersigned notary, personally appeared 
(signer's name) , who is 
personally known by mc to be the person whose name is signed on the 
preceding document, and acknowledged to mc that he /she signed it 
voluntarily for its staled purpose. 
Notary signature and seal 
B. If the signer proved his/her identity through documentary evidence: 
In the County of , State of Utah, on this 
day of , 19 , 
before me, die undersigned notary, personally appeared (signer's 
name) , who proved to mc his/her identity through 
documentary evidence in the form of a 
to be the person whose name is signed on the preceding document, and 
acknowledged to mc that he/she signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose. 
Notary signature and seal 
: The Utah Notary Public Guide. The Laws of Utah and You. 
State of Utah, Department of Business Regulation, Division 
of Corporation & Commercial Code. Spring 1988. 
C. If the signer took an oath vouching for the truthfulness of the document. 
In the County of , State of Utah, on this day 
of 19 , before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared (signer's name) 
who is personally known to me on "who proved to me his/her identity 
through documentary evidence in the form of a 
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence and 
who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary and the 
document truthful. 
Notary signature and seal 
D. If notarizing that the document is a true and correct copy of the original: 
In the County of , State of Utah, on the 
day of 19 , I certify that the preceding document 
is a true, complete, and unaltered photocopy made by 
of (description of document) . 
Notary signature and seal 
11 
Paul Franklin Farr (#1040) 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Suite 540 
BUSCH FORUM 
5295 South 320 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711 
Telephone: (801) 263-5555 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH 
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendants. 
) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S E 
) PARTE MOTION FOR EXTENSION ( 
) TIME TO FILE APPEAL 
) Civil No. 900747303CN 
) Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Plaintiffs Ex-Parte Motion for an Order to extend the time within which the 
Plaintiff may file an appeal having come on regularly before this Court, and after due 
consideration, with good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiff s Motion for an Order extending the time period within which 
the Plaintiff is to file an appeal is granted. 
2. The time by which the Plaintiff must file an appeal is extended to thirty 
(30) days past the prescribed time period or ten (10) past the date of 
the entry of this Order, whichever occurs later. 
DATED this 0-^ •x" day of November, 1991. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the ~ ' day of November, 1991, Plaintiff mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Steve C. Vanderlinden, Esq. 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FLOORCOVERINGS BY CERTIFIED, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 900747303 
vs. 
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN 
P. MORGAN, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY 
MAY 31, 1991 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
COURT'S RULING 
(Partial Transcript) 
Reported by: KELLY BROWN HICKEN, 
CSR, RPR 
ns. rr oi- Ah r 
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Reporter's Transcript of Court's Ruling, taken at Davis 
County, Utah, on Friday, May 31, 1991, before KELLY 
BROWN HICKEN, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah. 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: 
FOR PLAINTIFF: 
FOR DEFENDANT: 
* * * * * 
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR 
Attorney at Law 
5295 South 320 West, Suite 540 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN 
Attorney at Law 
1133 North Main, Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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FARMINGTON, UTAH, FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1991 
* * * * * 
THE COURT: The Court will make the following findings 
and decision in this matter: 
First, the Court does not find a contract between 
the plaintiff and defendants. It's clear from the believable 
testimony given to the Court that the defendants believed 
they were contracting with Don Smith. The plaintiff believed 
he was contracting with the defendants. 
But the fact that they each believed they were 
contracting with somebody else doesn't mean there's a 
contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
Don Smith has not been made a party to this action, 
so nothing the Court says with regard to him has any binding 
effect on his legal interests. Miles Construction Company 
has not been made a party to the action, and so, of course, 
nothing I say has any binding effect on Miles Construction 
Company. 
The defendants were not acting as agents for 
Miles Construction Company. Miles Construction Company was 
the actual owner of the lot at the time the work was done. 
They had entered into an earnest money agreement with the 
defendants to purchase that lot — or I should say to 
purchase the lot and the house that was being built on it. 
Richard Miles testified that having reviewed his 
1 files, he could see where there was a $1,206 flooring 
2 allotment. Apparently those who work with Miles Construction 
3 Company which is a corporation determined that the amount 
4 apparently had been agreed to be higher than that. The 
5 amount ultimately paid the defendants for that work was 
6 $1500. 
7 The defendants became owners of the property on 
8 November 24th, 1989, when the closing was signed. No matter 
9 what the defendants believed, the Court does not find that 
10 Don Smith ordered the vinyl and carpet from the plaintiff, 
11 nor was he an agent for the defendants. Don Smith needed his 
12 air conditioning repaired, and the defendants agreed to 
13 scratch his back if they, in turn, could get their back 
14 scratched. 
15 Defendant Stacey Morgan has testified that he gave 
16 him some air conditioning worth approximately 1200 for which 
17 he paid $800, which in the company he had a right to do. And 
18 for that, he just expected that the defendant — not the 
19 defendant. He expected that Don Smith was going to do the 
20 same thing for him when it came to carpeting. As I say, 
21 J carpeting, I mean carpeting and vinyl. 
22 I I believe the actual agreement was that the 
23 I defendants believed they were contracting with Don Smith. 
24 I Don Smith was walking a tight rope. He didn't want retailers 
25 | to believe that he was selling carpet without going through a 
1 retailer, and so he went to the plaintiff and asked the 
2 plaintiff to do him a favor by supplying carpet and vinyl to 
3 the defendants at a given price. 
4 The defendants have testified that they had a set 
5 price of $10.75 per yard installed for carpet and 9.75 per 
6 yard for vinyl. 
7 Plaintiff on the other hand, and the Court's not 
8 sure where he got his information from because I'm not 
9 persuaded he got it from the defendants. I think he — Well, 
10 he may have got his information from Don Smith. But he 
11 believed that he was to supply vinyl at 9.75 per yard, which, 
12 of course, is the same, and carpeting at 11.25 per yard, each 
13 of those being the installed price. That means there's no 
14 contract between the plaintiff and defendants. 
15 The defendants have acknowledged since this case 
16 first began that they were — at the time the lien was filed, 
17 at least at all times after November 24th, 1989, they were 
18 the owners of the property. That when they paid for that 
19 house, they also paid Miles Construction Company for the 
20 installation of the flooring; that the amount they were 
21 talking about was $1500, though I'm not sure the defendants 
22 even knew the figure at that time, but that's the figure that 
23 Miles Construction ultimately gave them. 
24 Richard Miles who seems to say at the time that the 
25 I defendants were trying to get their carpet and vinyl 
zn Court Reporter 
installed, they had a figure of 1206 or $1,206 to work from. 
In my finding I don't think it makes any difference. 
Ultimately, they were paid many months after this 
action was filed. Probably in the month of June 1990, the 
defendants were paid $1500 by Miles Construction Company for 
the flooring. 
It's clear from the evidence that the carpet was 
installed beginning on November 15th, 1989. It took three 
days to install it, was finished on November 17th, 1989. 
It's clear the plaintiff has a regular procedure 
which he used in this case to collect, which is when he 
finishes a job, he bills the parties for it and expects 
immediate payment. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the contract or at least 
it's a contract form dated November the 8th, 1989, that is 
sent to the — I suppose it's a document that was sent to the 
defendants showing the amount of $2,115 due and owing. 
His next procedure he says is when he doesn't 
receive pay as soon as he thinks he should, about 30 days 
later, he makes a phone call, which he did. 
That sometime after that, he sends them out a 
preliminary notice that he's going to file a lien, and he did 
that on January 3rd, 1990, by Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. And 
then he has a lien drawn which he files on January 19th, 
1990, dated the same day which he asks specifically for the 
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amount of $2,115. 
Now, there's been a considerable amount of 
controversy here on what the value of the work done was. I 
don't think there's any question from the testimony given 
that the defendants believed that they were being charged too 
much right from the beginning. 
Plaintiff has urged the Court to find that there 
was accord and satisfaction as evidenced by the answer filed 
on April 9th, 1990, specifically the third paragraph which 
said "On March 23rd, 1990, we reached an agreement with 
Floorcoverings regarding disputed invoice and service." 
Now, this action was filed on March 15th, 1990. I 
don't recall right offhand the date the 2,040 was actually 
sent. Wasn't it in June? 
MR. FARR: June. 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: It was, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you remember the dates? Somebody 
remember the dates? 
MR. FARR: June 12th is when I received it. 
THE COURT: Plaintiff received it on June 12th, of 
course, and it was payable to Mr. Farr personally apparently 
at his request. I'm aware that the plaintiff accepted that 
document or that amount at apparently counsel's suggestion. 
It was held until there was a judgment taken on the case. 
And- shortly thereafter, then it was applied toward the 
1 judgment. 
2 If one looks at that as an accord and satisfaction, 
3 certainly, then, the acceptance of that $2,040 ended the suit 
4 right then and there for 2,040 for everything. The Court 
5 finds that there was no accord and satisfaction. There could 
6 have been if the parties had been willing to agree at that 
7 time. 
8 Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning 
9 they owed some money. They have disputed the amount. Now, 
10 the Court's allowed — we've taken testimony from several 
11 people. The plaintiff or at least Mr. Delahunty on behalf of 
12 the plaintiff testified that the vinyl was 50 yards at 9.75 
13 or $9.75 per yard which is $487.50. 
14 And all of these you're going to have, if my math 
15 is right, my figures will be right. And if they're not, it's 
16 just a math error. 
17 Carpet at 11.25 at 130 yards 1,462.50 for a total 
18 of 1,950. 
19 Plaintiff acknowledged an error in calculating the 
20 carpeting which all of the parties have agreed was in error, 
21 recalculated it and later giving a $75 credit to the 
22 defendants. 123.33 yards is the figure that I accepted as 
23 the final amount at 11.25 per yard which is $1,387.47 plus 
24 the vinyl makes it a total at that time of 1,874.94. 
25 I Now, through all of these calculations that I give 
a. | to you, I'm always going to use the figures of 9.75 for the 
2 vinyl and 11.25 for the carpet, irrespective of the fact that 
3 the defendants testified they think there contract is for 
4 10.75. I do that because I've previously found that there is 
5 no contract between the parties. And I believe the 9.75 to 
6 be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the vinyl and 11.25 
7 to be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the carpet. 
8 Dennis Vanderlinden figured carpet at 121.33 yards 
9 which figures out at $1,364.97. He figured the vinyl at 
10 40 yards which comes to $390 for a total of $1754.97. 
11 David Seare figured the vinyl at 42 yards — or 
12 45 yards. He says give or take three yards. And I said 
13 "Does that mean 42 yards?" And he said "No. That means 
14 45 yards to 48 yards." So he distinctly said it didn't mean 
15 42 yards. That's my understanding. 
16 I figured his at 45 because that is the figure he 
17 used. That's the figure he determined. And when he gave 
18 that testimony, he said that 45 yard measurement included in 
19 the area of the cabinets and included the counting of pattern 
20 match. So David Seare figures I have at $438.75 for the 
21 vinyl, $1374.75 for the carpet which was at 122.2 yards for a 
22 total of $1813.50. 
23 Dean Chidester figured the vinyl at 40 yards for 
24 $390, 118.67 yards of carpet for $1335.04 for a total of 
25 $1725.04. So the difference between the high and the low, 
3\z[[u ^Rxourn cJrick&n Court Reporter 
1 this is just roughly $150 with four different people giving 
2 the figures. 
3 Now, the plaintiff has argued that as long as you 
4 file a lien it doesn't matter how much you claim because 
5 that's not important, 
6 It seems to the Court it's just very essentially 
7 important in a case of this nature. The lien filed in this 
8 case asks for $2,115. And apparently from the beginning, the 
9 defendants are saying it's too high. The plaintiff comes to 
10 a point of acknowledging a math error and acknowledges it 
11 should be $2,040 because it's $75 too high. 
12 Different carpet measurers measure it differently. 
13 And as I say, four of them have come up with four different 
14 figures ranging from a high and a low to just $150 
15 difference. 
16 Now, for this total lawsuit, that seems almost 
17 insignificant. But to the defendants, it's not 
18 insignificant. You're talking about an allowance by Miles 
19 Construction of $1500 for a total project, and in a claim by 
20 the plaintiff for $2,040. And this figure lies between the 
21 two. And I recognize I have not left — I deliberately left 
22 off the taxes and the preparation fee that I think are 
23 appropriate sums. I just haven't included them on this 
24 I because I would think that when we get through, the $40 
25 | preparation and the sales tax need to be added onto this no 
a/ rr rz^  -I/-./?... -r* ~.. -A r> ~ - ~ — ± ~ -
1 matter what figure the Court ultimately uses. 
2 And I don't think Dennis Vanderlinden was 
3 discredited in any way because he has been associated with 
4 his brother. But then neither is David Seare or Dean 
5 Chidester or the plaintiff. They're all very — as far as 
6 the Court can see, they were all four people trying to 
7 honestly tell what they thought it looked like to them. 
8 Now, with regard to the lien. That's a very 
9 important aspect of this case. The amount in the notice of 
10 lien is incorrect at $2,115. Even in the plaintiff's best 
11 view of it, it should be $2,040. I've said that the 
12 defendants were not the owners of the house at the time they 
13 asked the work to be done. But they had at that time a valid 
14 contract for purchasing, and nobody's presented the Court 
15 with a copy of that so I know whether it had been accepted by 
16 Miles Construction so that it was a binding contract between 
17 the parties. But in ruling, the Court kind of assumes that 
18 it was because it wound up being on November 24th an actual 
19 contract that was consummated. That doesn't mean it wasn't 
20 binding on the plaintiffs prior if the house had been 
21 appropriately finished as apparently they agreed on. We just 
22 don't know concerning what their negotiations were in that 
23 area. 
24 Now, the lien statute is there to protect anybody 
25 who, in this case the plaintiff, supplies something to that 
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house, but that it requires a bond. And we really don't know 
whether there was a bond in place in this case or not. The 
Court knows nobody's testified to no bond being in place. 
Miles Construction Company didn't want to be 
responsible because they had not made the contract. 
Don Smith didn't want to be responsible because he claimed he 
wasn't selling either vinyl or carpet, just doing a favor by 
persuading the plaintiff to do it. But the law still 
protects those people furnishing it. And so the Court's 
assuming there was no bond. Of course, I know as a practical 
matter that with most homes that are personally built, there 
are not bonds obtained for them even though the statute 
requires it. 
Now, the lien was filed within a reasonable period 
of time. January 19th was reasonable within the statutory 
time after the work was done on November 17th. The statute 
doesn't really require privity. Many times it's the 
contractor who subcontracts or who hires the work done, not 
the owner. But to protect those people who supply material 
and work on a job, the lien statute doesn't require there to 
be a privity. 
The current lien statute, and that's 38-1-7, and 
I'm not going to read the whole thing. Paragraph (2) does 
list those things, and I'm not going to read all of them that 
the plaintiff listed in there. It says the statement 
/-._„..„„ ^±l;rhEn Court Reporter 12 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
containing the day; the reputed owner. If not the reputed 
owner, if you don't know that, the record owner. 
I believe that was correctly stated at the time. I 
think the plaintiff had enough interest — or the defendants 
had enough interest in it and the plaintiff had no 
association with the contractor/owner at the time. And that 
when he checked the lien to see — or check the county 
recorder and so onto see who was the owner, it was listed as 
the defendants. So I think he did that one properly. 
The name of the person by whom he was employed. I 
think that on the lien statute, he, of course, lists Stacey 
and Kristin Morgan, and the Court has found that to be 
incorrect, but I did find that he believed that they were the 
ones that hired him. 
Under (c), the time the first and last labor was 
performed. He does list the 15th and 17th of November. 
(d), description of the property. There is one 
there, and nobody has argued anything except that it's 
correct. 
(e), given considerable amount of argument about 
that. The signature of a lien claimant or his authorized 
agent, and an acknowledgment or certificate is required under 
Chapter 3, Title 57. Then the statement "No acknowledgment 
or certificate is required for any notice after April 29th, 
1985, and before April 24th, 1989." So that last sentence 
has no application to this case because no work was done, no 
lien was filed until after that period. So you're left with 
just the one statement, the signature of lien claimant or his 
authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate. 
It does show the authorized signature. It's got 
Floorcoverings by Certified Incorporated. it's got the 
secretary signature and seal, and you've got the authorized 
officer as Allen Delahunty, and then you've got it notarized. 
The Court understands that this is a deficient 
certificate there. It doesn't really enter that the 
information is true. I'm sure that's what the plaintiff 
intended, it does say "...who swore or affirmed to me that 
he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the 
document is truthful," and that he signed it on before of the 
corporation. I think that's deficient personally. But it is 
the notary, of course, saying that this officer said that to 
him. 
So I think there are three problems in the lien 
notice of lien, and that's the ownership of the property, the 
amount requested. I'm not bothered by the fact that this 
parenthesis it says "owner" and in another set of parenthesis 
it says "contractor." Those are standard documents that are 
meant to have one or the other crossed out so that when you 
sign them, you know who you're referring to. The fact that 
it leaves them both there doesn't ~ the Court doesn't think 
(1/ PP C7~y MP 
damages any. So I think it's a deficient notice of lien for 
those reasons. 
I think the amount has to be correctly stated. 
Now, I believe the plaintiff is entitled to be paid 
for unjust enrichment, and the Court is not persuaded of 
which of the four amounts submitted is better than another. 
Whether it should be the lower figure of Mr. Chidester of 
1725 or whether it should be the higher figure of the 
plaintiff of 1875. And so I think a good resolution of that 
is just order an amount right between those two figures which 
is probably $1800. That will be the order of the Court, plus 
the $40 preparation plus the sales tax. 
And I think because of the nature of what I've said 
about this, each party should bear their own attorney's fees. 
Anything else? 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Did you want me — Excuse me. I'll 
stand up. I apologize. Do you want me to prepare the 
findings of fact and conclusions, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. You can prepare them. 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have all the exhibits? 
Which ones do you or don't have? 
THE CLERK: I need Defendants' 3 and 5. 
THE REPORTER: Here you go. 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: I'll need a copy of his findings of 
facts. 
THE COURT: Anything by either counsel before we be in 
adjournment? 
MR. VANDERLINDEN: Nothing on behalf of the defendant. 
MR. FARR: We have nothing, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. That's all. The 
Court will be adjourned. The clerk will see that she has all 
those documents before she quits. 
(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.) 
* * * * * 
